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'All Signs Indicate that Gestapo Agents Murdered Him': Soviet Disinformation, the Katyn massacre and the Raoul Wallenberg Case, 1945–7

Johan Matz*

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In the years 1945–52, that is, between Raoul Wallenberg's incarceration in the Lubianka prison in Moscow (6 February 1945) and the first Swedish demand for his return (11 February 1952), more than fifty people provided the Swedish Foreign Ministry with diffuse and often contradictory information about his whereabouts. This article argues that a number of these testimonies may have been part of a Soviet campaign of disinformation aimed at diverting the Swedes' attention away from Moscow and to have them believe that Wallenberg had died in Hungary. The appearance of messages to this effect by February–March 1945 may indicate that the Soviets had already decided at this early point never to let Wallenberg return alive, or at least to construct an option that would allow for such a decision. In August 1947, after twenty-six Swedish diplomatic approaches on account of Wallenberg over the course of two and a half years, the Soviets handed over a note signed by Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinskii that declared that Wallenberg had presumably died in Hungary. The note had the desired effect. No Swedish diplomatic approaches on Wallenberg were made for the next five years. This article argues that the Vyshinskii note was an extraordinary measure taken by the Soviets finally to get the message of Wallenberg's death in Hungary through to the Swedes. The Soviet disinformation regarding the 1940 Katyn massacre provides an interesting point of reference for understanding the way in which the Soviets tried to mislead Sweden over Wallenberg.

Keywords: USSR; Raoul Wallenberg; Katyn; disinformation; Cold War

Introduction: Soviet official and unofficial communication regarding Raoul Wallenberg

Seventy years have passed and still the case of the missing Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, assigned to Budapest by the United States and Sweden in 1944 to help save Jews from the Nazi death machine, remains unresolved. Despite in-depth reviews conducted by a joint Swedish-Russian working group in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, that is, when access to the archives was comparably good and despite a recent independent review of top-secret Soviet encrypted cables for the years 1944–7, our knowledge of Wallenberg's tenure in the Lubianka and Lefortovo prisons in Moscow, the Soviet motives for his arrest, and his eventual fate is, to put it mildly, fragmentary.[1]

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Among the rather few things that we know with certainty is that on 30–31 December 1944 the Swedish government, both in Moscow before the Soviet Foreign Ministry (NKID/MID)[2] and the Soviet diplomatic mission in Stockholm, requested Soviet help in locating and protecting the staffers of the Swedish Budapest mission and that Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vladimir G. Dekanozov, informed the Swedish Envoy in Moscow, Staffan Söderblom, on 16 January 1945 that Wallenberg had been found and was under Soviet military protection.[3] We know from testimonies by Wallenberg's and his driver Vilmos Langfelder's co-prisoners that the two were brought by train to Moscow; we know from the Lubianka prison registry that they were incarcerated there on 6 February; and we know that Wallenberg, according to the Lubianka diaries, was interrogated on five occasions and Langfelder on four occasions before July 1947.[4] We also know that the Soviets, in August 1947, handed over a note signed by Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinskii to the Swedish Envoy Rolf Sohlman denying any knowledge of Wallenberg's fate and that ten years later, in February 1957, they handed over a memorandum signed by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko with the opposite message: Wallenberg had indeed been brought from Budapest by the Soviets and incarcerated in the Lubianka and Lefortovo prisons in Moscow. Moreover, according to a report (attached to the Gromyko memorandum) allegedly authored by the Lubianka prison's chief medic, A. Smoltsov, a prisoner by the name of 'Walenberg' had died from cardiac arrest in Lubianka on 17 July 1947. Its authenticity is a matter of dispute to this day.[5]

When it comes to the Soviet–Swedish diplomatic deliberations over Wallenberg, we also know that immediately after the handing over of Dekanozov's note to Söderblom, the communication between the Swedes and the Soviets entered a qualitatively different state. From late January 1945 onwards, Soviet diplomats more or less consistently stonewalled whenever the Swedes made inquiries about Wallenberg, to a total of twenty-six times over the course of two and half years.[6] The awkward silence of the Soviet interlocutors in Moscow whenever Wallenberg was brought up implied that the Swedes started to look for clues to Wallenberg's fate elsewhere - either by trying to interpret the deeper meaning of certain discernible variations to the way in which the Soviets reacted to the Swedish approaches about Wallenberg and a number of parallel cases[7], or by trying to investigate the veracity of information provided by people who claimed to have heard of Wallenberg or seen him with their own eyes after his disappearance. The Swedish Foreign Ministry (Utrikesdepartementet, UD) was thus on the receiving end of two quite different forms of external inputs: *firstly* the diplomatic, that is, by official channels from the Soviet government; and, *secondly*, what might be labelled 'the unofficial' whose origins were in several cases unclear. Since the Swedes were unable to receive any authoritative information on Wallenberg by way of the official diplomatic channels in Moscow, at least before August 1947, the relative significance of the unofficial input, in the eyes of both UD officials and the political leadership of the Ministry, gradually increased from 1945 onwards. As a result, the time and effort spent trying to investigate the veracity of such input grew steadily.[8]

In the seven years from February 1945, when the first testimonies into Wallenberg's whereabouts appeared, until February 1952, when Sweden handed over a note to the Soviets demanding the return of Wallenberg for the first time, around fifty-five people provided UD with information regarding various aspects of Wallenberg's fate, ranging from the circumstances under which he was first encountered by Soviet forces to his ultimate fate. Each such testimony implied that UD's internal

communicative 'nervous system' to a greater or lesser extent was activated. In order to verify the identity of the informant(s), as well as the extent to which he or she provided information of relevance, letters and cables containing instructions and reports were sent between Stockholm and Swedish diplomatic missions abroad, memos were authored by secretaries both home and in foreign countries, and Swedish officials at times made a lot of effort to get to the bottom of the matter. Swedish diplomats in places as remote as Australia, South Africa, and Venezuela were ordered to trace witnesses. Some testimonies generated a considerable amount of paperwork.[9]

UD - a comparably small organisation even by international standards of the time - was clearly not well adapted for handling an investigation of this magnitude, spanning years and involving an abundance of often contradictory testimonies and informants whose trustworthiness was often very hard to ascertain.[10] The Ministry had indeed undertaken highly complex and unorthodox tasks before - the successful 1944 US–Swedish mission to protect the Hungarian Jews, in accordance with which Wallenberg had been commissioned to Budapest, is undoubtedly an example of that - and Swedish diplomats were by no means strangers to investigating the fates of individual Swedish citizens abroad. Keeping track of all the traces and maintaining a watchful and critical eye on the testimonies soon, however, proved too much. The fact that the case was entrusted to one of the 'best and brightest' brains of UD, the clear-sighted Grafström, was to be of little help. The political leadership's interest before 1947 in pursuing the case, either in Moscow or elsewhere, was generally low (and non-existent in 1947–52). Grafström and his aide, future Ambassador Lennart Petri, undoubtedly had other pressing matters to attend to. This was, after all, a period which saw both the end of Hitler's Third Reich and the beginnings of the Cold War. As a result UD became easy prey for sensation-seekers and frauds, but possibly also input of a quite different nature: information designed with the specific purpose of misleading the Swedes.[11]

This article argues that while Swedish diplomats were struggling hard to have their Soviet counterparts provide them with something more than their innocuous standard answers to the inquiries about Wallenberg, the Soviets were in fact trying to communicate messages to the Swedes by way of other means and channels: messages to the effect that the USSR had nothing to do with Wallenberg's disappearance and that he had died in Hungary shortly after his disappearance in January 1945. Such messages started to appear at a very early stage, even by February–March 1945 and, as will be argued below, the Vyshinskii note as well as two later attempts to mislead the Swedes through various channels should therefore possibly be understood as extraordinary measures to correct a campaign of disinformation that had failed to achieve its intended goals.

Why did Andrei Vyshinskii's note appear in August 1947?

Of the three official statements of the USSR on the Wallenberg case (that is, the Dekanozov note of 1945, the Vyshinskii note of 1947, and the Gromyko memorandum of 1957), the Vyshinskii note stands in a class of its own. While the Dekanozov note was undoubtedly true as to its content and the Gromyko memorandum at least to a considerable degree true (with the possible exception of the Smoltsov report), the message of the Vyshinskii note is untrue in almost every aspect. While the Soviets were as mentioned unwilling to enter into any discussion regarding Wallenberg's fate in the period leading up to the note, they were at least not telling lies. The Vyshinskii

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note set a new standard for Soviet–Swedish communication on the case as it introduced officially sanctioned untruth as part of the vocabulary:

> It is correct that the Foreign Ministry of the USSR on 14 January 1945 received a short message, founded on indirect information from one of the commanders with a military unit who took part in the battle of Budapest, that Wallenberg had been found on the Benczur street [in Pest]. [. . .] Later, in order to verify the message of 14 January regarding Wallenberg there have been meticulous investigations and inquiries for Wallenberg which however did not lead to any positive results and the Soviet officer who had given the message on Wallenberg has not been found. Wallenberg has also not been located in the camps of POWs and interned. [. . .]. [W]e must not forget that Wallenberg was in an area where there were Soviet troops during a period of intense fighting in Hungary when virtually anything might have happened - Wallenberg could on his own initiative have left the area of the Soviet troops, hostile aerial attacks could have come about, Wallenberg could have been killed from hostile fire etc. All further measures that have been taken after 30 January this year in order to investigate Wallenberg's fate have been unsuccessful. It only remains to be assumed that Wallenberg, during the fighting for Budapest has died or have been taken prisoner by the adherents of [Ferenc] Szalasi.[12]

The idea of providing the Swedes with a note with this content was clearly not spur of the moment. On the contrary, internal Soviet material, released in the course of the Swedish-Russian working group's archival reviews, shows that Vyshinskii had already begun preparing the note by early July 1947, shortly after former US Secretary of Trade, Henry Wallace, had brought the matter up with the Soviet Envoy in Washington D.C., Nikolai Novikov.[13] One may also note that Vyshinskii in May 1947 had urged Molotov to ask the Minister of Internal Security, Viktor Abakumov, 'to present a memo on the essence of the case and suggestions on how to have it liquidated'.[14] Moreover, when responding to the Swedish Envoy Gunnar Hägglöf's[15] inquiry on Wallenberg on 30 January 1947, his Soviet interlocutor Kirill N. Novikov answered (at least according to the Soviet minutes from the meeting) that Wallenberg had been found by the Soviets in Budapest at a time of intense fighting when more or less anything could have happened to him: 'He could have escaped, there could have been attacks by hostile aircrafts etc.'[16] Novikov's answer, which most probably did not come about by chance, shows that stories designed to mislead about Wallenberg's fate were already around in the MID at this point.[17]

Although the message of the Vyshinskii note was negative, the mere fact that the Soviets had responded at all was most probably considered a relief among UD's officials. The Swedish efforts had finally yielded a result that could be reported back to Stockholm. In addition, it rendered additional legitimacy to the strategy of investigating the unofficial input, whose significance as a result grew even further. In 2011, the Russian government declassified (almost) all of the encrypted diplomatic communication between the Soviet Foreign Ministry (NKID/MID) and the Soviet legation in Stockholm - a total of some 6,300 cables. In one such cable to Moscow, dated 23 August 1947, Chargé d'Affaires Semion Bazarov of the Soviet mission in Stockholm related the UD's press release in reaction to Vyshinskii's note in full:

> The Raoul Wallenberg case will not be forgotten as a result of the Soviet answer [i.e. the Vyshinskii note] and the Swedish side will continue to investigate the matter through unofficial channels, as stated by foreign minister [Östen] Undén in his presentation in the Riksdag. The working hypothesis of UD is that Wallenberg is no longer alive. Instead, we will to continue to investigate, with no prejudices, the traces and the information that from time to time appear from different people and in particular those who

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> have been imprisoned in concentration camps and who claim to have seen the disappeared Swede or heard about him. UD is not going approach Moscow with further requests to have the Russian authorities making new investigations.[18]

Bazarov's superiors in Moscow could hardly have hoped for a more straightforward confirmation that the note had been a success and that the Swedes would no longer bother them with the Wallenberg case. The Swedish position on the matter was henceforth, as voiced by Petri in his April 1948 presentation before the Swedish Parliament's Constitutional Committee, that Vyshinskii's note 'was of a type that that we could hardly return to the issue without bringing forth new facts'.[19] The Swedes stuck consistently to this policy for the next four and a half years.[20]

Whereas considerable analytic attention has been devoted to the Soviet-Swedish diplomatic exchanges over Wallenberg in general, in particular what has been understood as Soviet hints of a readiness to release Wallenberg through a barter in return for one or more Soviet refugees in Sweden, no attention has been devoted to investigating why the Vyshinskii note appeared precisely by August 1947, the deeper meaning of its appearance, and the fact that it represents a dramatic shift from the nature of Soviet communication on the matter characteristic of the preceding two and a half years. The note has exclusively been interpreted in the context of the diplomatic dialogue between Sweden and the USSR.[21] The fact that it represents an anomaly within this context has not been reflected upon.

The timing of the note was however a matter of dispute among the Swedes in 1948. At Petri's above-mentioned 1948 presentation before the Constitutional Committee, MP Elias Håstad questioned Petri's understanding of the note as a direct result of the Swedish Moscow mission's repeated approaches regarding Wallenberg to the Soviet NKID/MID. Håstad held that it may equally well be explained as resulting from the activities of the popular Wallenberg movement, which had organised rallies and had made an unannounced visit to the Soviet diplomatic mission in Stockholm on 15 July 1947, with a letter addressed to Stalin demanding the return of Wallenberg. Petri answered:

> That the wording of the Vyshinski note left no doubts that it constituted an answer to the Swedish mission's demarches. That there should be a causal relationship between the public meetings of the Wallenberg movement and the Vyshinskii note had never been even contemplated within UD or the mission in Moscow.[22]

Judging from the fact that Bazarov immediately reported on the visit and its political consequences in no fewer than three cables, Håstad's interpretation seems, however, anything but far-fetched.[23] Public interest in the Wallenberg case had soared ever since the publication of Austrian émigré author Rudolph Philipp's book on Wallenberg in November 1946[24] and it is a fact (which was also reported by Bazarov to Moscow) that the Wallenberg movement brought together several crowded popular movements, including the largest consumer organisation in Sweden, Kooperativa förbundet. In all the movement claimed to represent about one million people. Its potential impact on the Kremlin leadership should by no means be underestimated. The Vyshinskii note did after all appear a mere month after the movement's visit, whereas UD's approaches to the Soviets had been made for well over two years to no avail. One may here note that Swedish Foreign Minister Undén's addressing of the matter during a talk with the Soviet Envoy in Sweden, Il'ia Chernyshev, a little

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more than three months earlier, on 10 April 1947, generated just a few lines in the Envoy's report to Moscow.[25]

As is evident from the encrypted Soviet diplomatic reporting from Sweden, the Soviets had been deeply concerned since 1945 about what they perceived to be an increasing Western dominance in Sweden, both in terms of military co-operation and economic dependence.[26] In March 1946, the Soviet leadership had heeded Chernyshev's calls for a change towards a more lenient Soviet policy towards Sweden and, judging from Bazarov's reports, the activities of the Wallenberg movement were perceived as strengthening pro-Western and anti-Soviet circles in Sweden. The Soviet leadership was evidently listening to Bazarov. As a result of his cables, on 22 July Vyshinskii renewed his May and July demands on Abakumov to report on the case.[27] Håstad's argument as well as the recent discovery of Bazarov's cables among the internal encrypted communication thus shows that approaching the note strictly from the perspective of the diplomatic negotiations over Wallenberg implies that we fail to see the broader political objectives that may have motivated its appearance. While such a perspective indeed provides us with a very important dimension, it is however not necessarily the full picture.

The intended purpose of the Vyshinskii note was clearly to divert the Swedes' attention away from Moscow in favour of having them investigate Wallenberg's fate in Hungary. In that sense the note was, as mentioned, successful. It failed however to convince the members of the Wallenberg movement, as well as the three MPs Bertil von Friesen, Ture Nerman, and Vilhelm Lundstedt. In December 1947 these MPs challenged the veracity of the note by having Wallenberg nominated as candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize. In their letter of nomination the following was stated:

> That [Wallenberg] at present is not a free man should be no obstacle for having him receiving the prize. Instead there is the possibility that this could facilitate his return to his native country and his home. A parallel case in this regard is Carl von Ossietsky who received the peace prize of 1935. Badly ill after hardships and maltreatment in the concentration camps, the Nazis [. . .] considered it necessary to move him to a hospital where he received better treatment. The Nobel prize thus became the only or in any case the last bright spot in his martyrdom.[28]

As is evident, the MPs spoke of Wallenberg as alive in Soviet imprisonment. In addition, they drew a very provocative parallel, from Moscow's point of view, between Wallenberg and the German Carl von Ossietsky, who spent several years in Nazi concentration camps. In response an entire article in the Soviet weekly *Novoie vremia* (*New Times*), in January 1948, was devoted exclusively to the Wallenberg case and the Peace Prize nomination:

> A new campaign of slander against the Soviet Union has been unleashed in Sweden. Delving into the rubbish heap of anti-Soviet fabrications the servitors of Swedish and foreign reaction have dragged out and revived the so-called Wallenberg affair. The substance of the 'affair' can be summed up in a few words. During the height of the battle for the Hungarian capital, early in 1945, a member of the Swedish mission staff in Budapest named Raul Wallenberg was reported missing. Whether this representative of a neutral state was killed by the frenzied Nazis or the bandits of Szalasy remained unknown. During the furious street fighting that was going on at the time all residents of Budapest, even those who were Swedish citizens, were obviously in a precarious position. The thorough investigation of Wallenberg's fate which the Soviet authorities made on the request of the Swedish government yielded no result: the initial information that

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> he had been found by Soviet military authorities was not corroborated. The most thorough search did not disclose him among the interned and prisoners of war either where he might have got to by accident.[29]

It is interesting to note that this article was translated into Norwegian and published in the Norwegian Communist Party's newsletter Friheten as well as the Soviet Oslo-legation's bulletin Nytt fra Sovjet-samveldet. In what seems to have been an attempt to render an air of legality to the Vyshinskii note and possibly also to send a signal to the Norwegian Peace Prize Committee (which was due to announce the winner later in the year)[30], the message of the note was repeated a third time during the June 1948 Hungarian people's court trial of the former head of the Arrow Cross' Budapest organisation, Imre Nidosi. One of the witnesses, Karoly Müller, reportedly testified that Wallenberg had been murdered on the orders of Arrow Cross leader Miklós Dési-Dregán in Buda.[31] A word-for-word transcript of Müller's testimony before the court was later, on 23 October, published in the Hungarian journal *Képes Figelö*.[32]

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The Katyn massacre and Soviet disinformation

Wallenberg's fate has often been understood through the prism of the case of the two Swiss diplomats, Harald Feller and Max Meier, both stationed at the Swiss legation in Budapest in 1944, and, just like Wallenberg, arrested by the Soviets in early 1945, brought to Moscow, and imprisoned.[33] Swiss inquiries regarding the missing diplomats were to begin with, just like in Wallenberg's case, met with Soviet denials of any knowledge into their whereabouts.[34] However, it was already clear by late summer 1945 that they were held by the Soviets; later that year the Soviets clearly signalled their readiness to initiate negotiations over their release through barter, in return for Soviet defectors in Switzerland.[35] Aside from a rather ferocious Soviet campaign throughout the spring of 1945 aimed at depicting Switzerland as a 'fascist state' with close ties to Hitler[36], there is nothing to indicate that the Soviets ever tried to mislead the Swiss with information to the effect that the two diplomats were dead, lost, or the like.[37] This crucial difference between the cases of Feller and Meier and Wallenberg has consistently been overlooked in earlier analyses.[38] The same holds for the Swedish journalist, Edward af Sandeberg, who had spent almost a year imprisoned in the USSR.[39] There were never any rumours in circulation of any traceless disappearance or death in his case. Wallenberg was thus for some reason treated differently by the Soviets and in order to understand their handling of his case, I argue, we have to look elsewhere for adequate points of reference. It is maintained here that the Katyn massacre of 1940 and the ensuing Soviet attempts to conceal involvement in this horrendous crime is better suited as a relevant parallel case.

In the early spring of 1940 approximately 22,000 Polish prisoners of war, captured and deported by the NKVD after the Nazi German–Soviet partition and occupation of Poland of August 1939, were executed in the Katyn forest and at a number of other places in western USSR (*inter alia* Kozielsk, Ostahkov, and Starobielsk) on the orders of Stalin.[40] In the wake of the outbreak of war with Nazi Germany in June 1941, Stalin established diplomatic relations with the Polish government-in-exile in London, Polish soldiers in Soviet camps were granted amnesty, and a Polish Army to fight the Germans was formed in the USSR under the command of General Wladyslaw Anders. However, the number of soldiers joining the ranks from the three above-mentioned camps was astonishingly few: a mere 448 individuals.[41] The rest

had disappeared without a trace. Repeated inquiries into their whereabouts by the Polish government were left unanswered by the Soviets.[42]

In April 1943, the Germans discovered thousands of corpses buried in mass graves at Katyn and immediately made their findings known to the world as part of their war propaganda. British and US prisoners of war, brought to the scene by the Germans, as well as an international commission of forensic and medical expertise, verified that the bodies had been shot three years earlier at a point when the Germans were nowhere near the site.[43] The Soviets vehemently denied any guilt. When the area was later recaptured by the Soviet Army, a Soviet Commission headed by the surgeon Nikolai Burdenko blamed the Germans for the massacre; after the war, the Soviets, in order to once and for all render judicial legitimacy to the conclusions of the Burdenko Commission, had their British, French, and US allies agree to have the matter raised during the proceedings of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1946. The Soviet prosecutors, however, faced determined resistance from the lawyers of the indicted Nazi leadership, who were able to prove that the Germans could not possibly have murdered the Poles. The Tribunal, however, stopped short of issuing any verdict directed against the USSR. Instead it ruled that the matter must be dropped since its remit was only to investigate the crimes of the Nazis.[44]

An interesting feature of the Soviet disinformation campaign on the Katyn massacre is the repeated switching between different types of channels for communicating false messages. First there is the purportedly scientific Burdenko Commission, followed by the purportedly legalistic attempt to have a verdict issued by the Nuremberg Court, followed in turn by a variety of channels ranging from Western academics, journal articles, and so on.[45] As already pointed out above, we may in fact distinguish a similar pattern in the Wallenberg case, with the Vyshinskii note of August 1947, followed by the article in *Novoie vremia*, followed in turn by the Nidosi trial and the *Képes Figelö* article.

Whereas the Vyshinskii note represents an anomaly when looked upon in the context of the Soviet–Swedish diplomatic deliberations, the same cannot be said when it is approached in the context of the above-mentioned switching between different channels for disseminating false information. In fact the note forms part of what might be understood as a campaign of disinformation involving different channels and outlets. Campaigns of disinformation, designed to manipulate individuals, public opinion, and foreign governments were one out of a range of instruments (so-called active measures, *aktivnye meropriiatiia*) employed by the USSR's intelligence organisations to further the goals and objectives of the Soviet state.[46] It would, however, be a mistake to believe that such campaigns were the sole prerogative of the intelligence services. If needed, the services of other branches of government could be engaged. Again, taking a strictly diplomatic perspective on the Vyshinskii note means that we fail to perceive it through the possibly more adequate prism of *aktivnyie meropriiatiia*, that is, as part of a much broader strategy to mislead. Such a perspective also raises the question of whether we can distinguish attempts to disseminate false information before the appearance of the note.

The study of disinformation

While the release of some documentation from former Soviet archives has allowed for studies into how Soviet intelligence gathered information[47], studies into the conduct of Soviet disinformation campaigns are very rare.[48] The prime reason is obviously that

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access to the relevant Soviet archives (that is, the domestic and foreign security services, FSB and SVR) remains heavily restricted, not to say completely blocked, and the fact that the methodological challenges are tricky.[49] Analysts have nonetheless attempted to approach the matter and one interesting example is Boghardt's (2009) study into the rumours circulating in the early 1980s implicating the United States in the outbreak of the AIDS pandemic.[50] This claim first appeared in 1983 when the Indian newspaper *Patriot* published an anonymous letter to the editor saying that AIDS could be traced to US biological-agent experiments and CIA-sponsored testing of drugs on humans in the 1950s.[51] Boghardt also shows that identical claims appeared two years later, in 1985, through an article in the Soviet *Literaturnaia gazeta*, which pointed to 'the parallel' between the appearance of AIDS in US East Coast cities and US biological warfare programmes of the 1950s and 1960s.[52]

Bittman (1985) notes that 'to succeed, every disinformation message must at least partially correspond to reality or generally accepted views.'[53] The decoding of a message thus involves a close reading of the way in which such undisputed views are mixed with facts and information that can arguably be said to reflect certain interests of a particular state. The *Patriot* article for example, Boghardt holds, picked up on a series of medically established facts such as the concern over contaminated blood donations, that AIDS was probably caused by a virus, and so on, as well as some indisputable and publicly known facts about the US biological warfare programme. The Burdenko Commission in a similar manner pointed to the use of German bullets for the executions at Katyn as evidence (but made no mention of the fact that German armaments were widely used by both the Soviet military and the police at the time of the massacre).[54] The Vyshinskii note was likewise careful in linking the false message of Wallenberg's disappearance and possible death to a number of indisputable facts and half-truths: for example, the 14 January message from the Soviet front to Moscow that Wallenberg had been found, the date of the fall of Budapest - 12 February (which was really only the date of the fall of the western half of the city, Buda; the eastern side, Pest, where Wallenberg was found, fell under Soviet control around 15-19 January 1945)[55], as well as the above-mentioned conversation in January 1947 between Hägglöf and Novikov.

Reflections over the timing of a certain message are also of crucial importance for determining whether it should be considered disinformation. Boghardt points, for example, at the complex state of East–West relations during the early 1980s as a cause for the AIDS campaign. He likewise points to a number of events that may be understood as having contributed to the Soviet decision to reactivate the campaign, *inter alia* a US report in February 1985 claiming that the Soviets had broken the Geneva Convention by producing biological weapons.[56] As for the Vyshinskii note we have already pointed to the possible connection between the Wallenberg movement's visit to the Soviet legation on 15 July, Bazarov's encrypted cables, and the appearance of the note; we have also pointed to the Peace Prize nomination and the articles in *Novoie vremia* and *Képes Figelö*.

It is likewise crucial to study the conditions under which the message first made its appearance with the target of disinformation. Boghardt holds that India - a large, non-aligned country with a diverse English-speaking press - was an ideal staging ground for the AIDS campaign. India put few restrictions on the presence of Soviet intelligence personnel and indeed *Patriot* had, Boghardt holds, even been established in 1967 with the very purpose of disseminating Soviet-inspired articles.[57] Andrew

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and Gordievskii (1990) likewise hold that *Novoie vremia* was used as a 'vehicle for active measures'.[58]

We must also broaden our search and ask ourselves whether we can distinguish a pattern of similar messages given over a certain period of time. In addition to putting together a chronology of suspected cases of disinformation, this stage also calls for the study and systematisation of official statements from the state believed to be the sender of disinformation. If we can detect that official statements (such as the Vyshinskii note) correspond, in terms of content and timing, to a wider pattern of messages disseminated through other channels (journal articles, politically oriented academics, witnesses, and so on) this may be of help in identifying cases of disinformation.

Disinformation does not, however, always appear via mass media. People are also used for transmitting a message or providing credibility to certain claims. Boghardt points to the important role played by the retired East German biophysicist Professor Jakob Segal for providing some degree of 'scientific credibility' to the claim regarding the United States as the originator of AIDS. Zaslavsky points to the Italian researcher Guiseppe Boffa as an example of a Western historian 'who [was] ideologically committed to the Soviet Union [and] continued to deny Soviet responsibility [for the Katyn massacre] in keeping with [his] political orientation right up to the end of the Cold War.'[59] As will be outlined in further depth below, certain individuals seem to have fulfilled crucial roles in what appears to have been Soviet attempts to communicate messages to the Swedes before the Vyshinskii note. One should, however, be careful not to equate the act of providing misleading information with malicious intent. Identifying a person as a provider of disinformation is not the same as saying that he or she has necessarily understood that he or she has been used for such a purpose. Bittman argues that disinformation can be likened to a game in which the participants play one of three roles, where *operator* refers to the author behind the disinformation, *adversary* to a foreign state, and *unwitting agent* to 'a gameplayer who is unaware of his true role and is exploited by the operator as a means of attacking the adversary'.[60] While identifying the unwitting agents, mapping their *modus operandi* and trying to determine their connection to the originator of the disinformation campaign is of crucial importance for understanding the disinformation game, it is not necessarily the same as accusing them of being in the service of a foreign state.

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Early examples of misleading information: Szeben, Földes, Langlet, and Böhm (February–March 1945)

The Soviet leadership must have known that bringing the Katyn massacre to Nuremberg was a project fraught with considerable risk. In fact, the rationale behind doing it seems anything but evident. Possibly, the decision reflects a sense of frustration over the Burdenko Commission's failure to provide irrefutable evidence of German guilt. In that sense, the move could arguably be considered extraordinary and perhaps even desperate. Just like the Soviet initiative in Nuremberg there is arguably, as mentioned above, an air of extraordinariness or even recklessness around the Vyshinskii note as well. Given that the Soviets had, after all, truthfully reported to the Swedes in January 1945 that Wallenberg was in their hands, they must have realised that the Swedes might sooner or later come across a witness who could indeed disclose its untruthfulness. They were evidently aware that on his return to Sweden af

Sandeberg had appeared in the press with claims, on the basis of information that he had received from co-prisoners, that Wallenberg was alive in Soviet custody.[61] It is in sum hard to escape the impression that the Soviets were far from comfortable with the note. But if this were a last desperate attempt to have the Swedes stop asking for Wallenberg in Moscow, this implies that they must have tried to have the Swedes to get the message of Wallenberg's death at some earlier point. If so, when did they do that? And what channels did they use to convey such a message to the Swedes?

As mentioned above, Dekanozov's note to Söderblom on 16 January marks the end of the relatively straightforward Soviet–Swedish communication over Wallenberg and his colleagues at the Swedish Budapest mission that had characterised the period after the Swedish request of 30–31 December 1944 for help in locating them. Throughout late January and February 1945 the Swedish Envoy tried to acquire further information on their whereabouts through the NKID. His efforts were, however, all in vain. His Soviet contacts simply refused to say anything on the matter. On 3 March 1945 Söderblom finally received information, not by the Soviets but by the UD, that the Budapest diplomats had been located at the mission of the Papal nuncio in Budapest.[62] In order to clarify whether this news also included that of Wallenberg, Söderblom telegrammed the Swedish Envoy in Bucharest, Patrik Reuterswärd, who answered that Wallenberg was not among the rest of the staffers and that he had left Budapest by car for an unknown destination on 17 January.[63] As shown by the Eliasson Commission, from this point onwards Söderblom, frustrated with the Soviet stonewalling on Wallenberg, sought to have the entire matter with the missing Wallenberg referred to the jurisdiction of the Swedish diplomatic mission in Romania.[64] An instruction from UD of 8 March to communicate a message, via Soviet authorities to Wallenberg[65], was left unattended to by Söderblom, who instead forwarded it to Reuterswärd.[66]

The news of Wallenberg's departure on 17 January had first appeared with the Swedish Bucharest mission via a Hungarian refugee, Paul Szeben, who appeared in the Romanian capital by late February.[67] In a letter to Reuterswärd written on 11 February (but registered in Bucharest by late February), the Head of the Swedish Red Cross in Budapest, Valdemar Langlet, confirmed Szeben's information.[68] In addition, some time before 14 March, another Hungarian arriving in Bucharest, the journalist Bela Földes, told Reuterswärd that Wallenberg had been murdered.[69] While at least Szeben's (and Langlet's) message on Wallenberg's departure found its way to Söderblom, Földes' message seems to have been stuck in Bucharest.[70]

It is interesting to note that Langlet claims to have visited Debrecen - the site of both the Soviet military command and the Soviet-controlled Hungarian government - in February 1945.[71] One may also note that in his telegram on Szeben Reuterswärd noted that he arrived in Bucharest by way of Debrecen.[72] It is also of interest to note that Arkadii Vaksberg, in his biography of the Soviet Envoy to Sweden (from 1930–45) Aleksandra Kollontai, notes that:

> Impulsively (not to say hysterically) Moscow not only changed its tactics and also its position and started searching for channels in order to convey information to the Swedes that was diametrically opposite to the ones that they had provided earlier. Bucharest, to where the Swedish Budapest legation had been evacuated because of the battles, was chosen as the channel. Soviet diplomats briefed their Swedish colleagues at a reception that nothing was known in Moscow regarding Raoul Wallenberg and that he had disappeared somewhere. This sensational piece of news was immediately forwarded to Stockholm. This happened on 12 March 1945.[73]

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Regrettably, Vaksberg presents no archival reference or other documents to support this interesting description. It is, however, a fact that the archival findings of the Eliasson Commission with some minor exceptions, as described above, verify Vaksberg's account.[74] Bucharest is evidently the channel through which the early misleading information regarding Wallenberg appeared and the scenario outlined by Vaksberg seems fully reasonable. UD was, however, unaware that Söderblom knew about Szeben's information and continued throughout March 1945 to instruct him to approach the Soviets regarding Wallenberg.[75] It was not until 29 March that UD declared before Söderblom that Wallenberg was lost.[76] The most immediate reason why UD conveyed this information was that Reuterswärd, on 28 March, had cabled that 'Danielsson has no news about Wallenberg'[77], but most certainly also the fact that the Swedes on 15 March had been approached in Stockholm by the Hungarian refugee and translator at the British legation's Press Reading Bureau, Vilmos Böhm, first by telephone and later through a letter containing a written transcript from a news broadcast that had (allegedly) been aired by the Soviet-controlled Hungarian Kossuth radio on 8 March. The broadcast had been in Hungarian but the version that Böhm handed over was in English.

There is no doubt that Böhm's message made its way into UD's bureaucratic machinery and that it did become one of the many 'facts' referred to in memos, letters, and reports for several years hence. We shall return to it below, but of at least equal importance for the death narrative to become something of an established fact among some diplomats was that it had an ardent propagator at a key position within the UD's institutional structure, that is, the Swedish Envoy to Moscow, Söderblom. Moreover, Söderblom seems not to have known of the Kossuth radio broadcast, at least not before his visit to Stockholm in June and possibly not even then. Instead, his conviction was based, firstly on the above-mentioned news from Szeben on Wallenberg's departure on 17 January, and secondly on his talk with Danielsson, who passed through Moscow on 13 April. During their stay in Bucharest, Danielsson and his colleagues had read a letter from Langlet to Reuterswärd, dated 28 March, in which he speculated that Wallenberg 'may have fallen into the hands of disguised Arrow Cross men in which case one could fear the worst about his fate'.[78] It seems likely that Danielsson shared this information with Söderblom, who immediately dispatched this theory to Stockholm:

> Wallenberg, who had been sentenced to death by the Arrow Cross and the Germans, snuck on his own initiative to the Russians. I was notified as soon as he was found. Thereafter, Wallenberg seems to have left for Debrecen by car and is said to have been killed during the trip. There are a number of theories: accident (very likely), murder with robbery, ambush by the Arrow Cross. I am afraid we will never know for certain.[79]

From this point onwards he was to repeat this theory before the Soviets on at least four occasions.[80] It is a very unfortunate coincidence that in addition to the two types of external input mentioned above, that is, the official diplomatic and the unofficial, which put UD in the awkward position of having to investigate and interpret vague and contradictory signals, Sweden had an envoy in Moscow who repeatedly and strongly propagated that the Wallenberg case should not be pursued in Moscow but in Bucharest and Budapest.[81] On the other hand, UD staffers, including both the Foreign Minister Christian Günther and Undén, were generally quite hesitant regarding Söderblom's judgment. He was simply considered a bit odd. Grafström

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has a number of entries in his diary that air serious concerns over having a person like Söderblom stationed in Moscow.[82]

The Soviets were likewise sceptical about the Swedish Envoy's behaviour. In an encrypted cable of 29 June 1945, Chernyshev reported from a reception in Stockholm that Söderblom had been drunk, that he had talked loudly of the failures of the Swedish King Charles XII, and proclaimed that for his efforts to accomplish a rapprochement between Sweden and the USSR he 'will go down in history'.[83] Eventually he had been asked to leave. Incidents such as these were obviously well known within the small community of diplomats and political elite in Stockholm. Later, in March 1946, in an internal memo about the future of Soviet relations with Sweden, Chernyshev suggested that Söderblom should be replaced, citing that several leading industrialists and social democrats had told him that Söderblom was not suitable as Sweden's Envoy to the USSR.[84] While there are few if any indications that UD staffers at the time were critical of Söderblom's understanding of the Wallenberg case more specifically, this general scepticism towards him must be taken into account when estimating the consequences of his handling of the case. In short, one should be careful not to overemphasise his importance.[85]

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Böhm's misleading messages of March 1945, May 1946, and November 1946

Schiller (1991) is the first to have identified Böhm as acting on behalf of the USSR. The Eliasson Commission likewise suggested such a scenario and his 15 March message to the UD is undoubtedly worth dwelling upon in some detail.[86] Böhm's letter to the UD read as follows:

> Talk: The Terrorism of the Man-hunters. Swedish Diplomat on Hungarian Deportations A member of the Swedish diplomatic corps Waldemar Langlet who worked in Budapest on behalf of the Swedish Red Cross, said to journalists that up to the beginning of this year the Germans have deported 350,000 people from Hungary to Germany. These 350,000 people are those whom the Germans have murdered after the deportation or who are being tortured to death in prisons and concentration camps. If we take into account those newly deported from Trans-Danubia then this number rises to 500,000. This figure does not include those who have been dragged away by force to war service or war work. Their number amounts to a few hundred thousand, and their ranks too are heavily decimated by death. Terrorism of the Hitlerite an [sic] Arrow Cross bandits results in a terrible destruction of the country's population.
>
> One of the chiefs of the Red Cross work in Budapest during the German occupation was Raoul Wallenberg who disappeared without any trace on 17th January. All signs indicate that Gestapo agents murdered him. The representative of the Swedish Red Cross pointed out that in contrast to the Germans the Russian's Town Commandant of Budapest, Cherbyshev, and all other officers of the Red Army have done everything in their power to enable the Swedish Legation and Swedish Red Cross to continue their work unhindered.[87]

This text can arguably be divided into four main parts. *The first part* recounts statements by Langlet detailing the number of people who had been deported out of Hungary by the Germans; *the second* consists of a more general statement on 'the terrorism of the Hitlerite and Arrow Cross bandits' of a type very much resembling the standard Soviet propaganda at the time; *the third* contains two main statements: Wallenberg 'disappeared without a trace on 17 January' and 'all signs indicate that

Gestapo agents murdered him'; and *the fourth* praises the Soviet authorities for having enabled the Swedish legation and 'the Swedish Red Cross to continue their work unhindered'.

The first question we should need to ask is why Böhm not only gave this information over the phone, but even handed in a written version of it to UD. Böhm had been working for several years as a reader and translator at the British diplomatic mission's Press Reading Bureau in Stockholm. Over the years he must have read hundreds or even thousands of Hungarian articles and Hungarian radio broadcasts, several of which must have touched on issues of potential interest to Swedish authorities. There are, however, no records that he had ever provided UD with such transcripts before. But perhaps this extraordinary measure was motivated out of concern for Wallenberg? In June 1944 Böhm had written an extensive report on the political developments inside Hungary for the US mission (which was shared with Wallenberg), and he had personally met with Wallenberg before his departure on 7 July to Budapest and provided him with details on potential Hungarian collaborators for his life-saving mission.[88] Moreover, Böhm, under the alias 'Gustavsson', received coded messages from Wallenberg at least throughout July 1944.[89] One might thus hold that Böhm may have had a personal interest in his fate.

There are, however, a number of elements in the text that must be considered unexpected and which put the way in which this message was delivered to UD into question. *Firstly*, if Wallenberg is the crucial factor motivating the message at all, why bother with providing all the lengthy details on the number of people deported, propagandistic references to the Hitlerite and Arrow Cross bandits, and the praiseworthy behaviour of the Soviet authorities in Budapest? Why not go straight for the news on Wallenberg? Instead, the better part of the message is devoted to such tangential information. Wallenberg by contrast is addressed very briefly in a mere two statements that leave no room for doubt; Wallenberg 'disappeared without any trace on 17th January' and 'all signs indicate that Gestapo agents murdered him'. Regardless of whether Szeben should be considered an unwitting agent or not, there are no doubts that the Soviets were aware that the date of Wallenberg's disappearance, 17 January, was at this point circulating within the UD bureaucracy.[90]

It seems hard to escape the impression that the author of this message, by being very precise about the date of his disappearance, was anxious to link this message to previously known 'facts'. The dead-certain statement that 'all signs indicate' that Gestapo agents had murdered Wallenberg likewise signals anxiety - there is no attempt to go into what these 'signs' were - and the naming of the Gestapo as the culprit likewise linked to the well-known fact that Wallenberg had been saving Jews and that his life had been threatened by no other than Eichmann in December 1944, as was known within UD and possibly also to the Soviets.[91] In addition, by presenting the information on Wallenberg after the very detailed introduction, with references to more or less known facts on the number of deported peoples, the credibility of the message as a whole, including the surprisingly short passage on Wallenberg, is arguably enhanced.

Secondly, the last section is particularly interesting in light of the fact that Soviet authorities had in fact done everything *but* allow 'the Swedish legation to continue its work unhindered'. The staffers, including the Swedish Envoy Carl Ivan Danielsson, had been taken into custody and denied contacts with the outside world. Danielsson had been forbidden to resume his work as Swedish Envoy to Hungary and together with his staffers forcibly evacuated from Budapest and deported to Sweden

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by way of Dunavecse, Timisoara, Bucharest, and Moscow. Danielsson, Secretary Per Anger, and Attaché Lars G. Berg were subjected to pressing interrogations during which they were accused of being German agents, among other things.[92] Moreover, as mentioned earlier, Soviet troops repeatedly plundered the Swedish legation in Budapest.[93] In light of the fact that this breaching of the Swedish mission's diplomatic immunity received extensive coverage in the Swedish press in late May 1945, that the Swedish government issued a protest, and that Dekanozov himself had the matter investigated with the Soviet military authorities, there are fairly good reasons to hold that the transcript, aside from providing disinformation about Wallenberg, also sought to stem future criticism of the Soviet military's actions in Budapest.[94] In short, the message seems a little too perfectly designed to fit with Soviet aims than to have been a series of mere coincidences. This also holds for its timing. A little more than a week before the transcript reached UD one of the major Swedish dailies, *Dagens nyheter*, had a front-page article praising the efforts of the Swedish Budapest mission and, in particular, Wallenberg's work.[95]

As regards timing, one may note that Böhm repeated the same message at least twice during periods that for various reasons must be considered critical in the early history of the Wallenberg case. On 28 May 1946, now in the capacity of post-war Hungary's first Envoy to Sweden, he appeared in an interview with the paper *Stockholmstidningen* saying that Wallenberg, after having been found by the Russians, had insisted on immediately leaving for the city of Debrecen in order to get in touch with the new Hungarian government. Wallenberg been warned that the roads there could be unsafe due to the still operating Arrow Cross bands and German troops. Wallenberg had therefore been given an escort of two Soviet officers, who just like Wallenberg, had not been heard from since. The personal belongings of one of the officers had been found but no corpses had been located; it was therefore assumed, Böhm held, that their bodies had been thrown into the Danube.[96]

Four months before this interview, the Swedish Envoy in Hungary, Arfwedsson, had reported that he had been approached by an anonymous person who claimed to have seen Wallenberg in a car together with three Soviet soldiers: Major Dimitrii Demtchinko, Rausha Juldashoff, and Abolubraman Juldaschoff.[97] This information was forwarded by Grafström on 12 February to Söderblom[98], who in turn handed over the information to the Soviets on 9 March.[99] As is evident from reviews in former Soviet archives, this was one of the five documented cases in which the MID forwarded (on 20 March 1946) a Swedish request to other Soviet governmental authorities (including the MGB).[100] It must therefore have been deemed important. About a month and a half after its entrance into the Soviet governmental machinery Böhm thus provided an answer to the Swedes. All were dead and their bodies were never to be found.

Böhm's third appearance in the Wallenberg case also came at a very dramatic point in time. On 28 November 1946, in the immediate wake of Philipp's book and the appearance of Prime Minister Tage Erlander in Parliament to describe and defend UD's handling of the case, Böhm paid a visit to the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Karl Ivan Westman, claiming he was 'personally convinced' that Wallenberg was no longer alive, that Wallenberg together with his two Soviet guards had been ambushed by the Arrow Cross in a suburb of Budapest, and that both Wallenberg and his guard had disappeared without a trace. He also remarked that he had known Philipp for a long time, that he was 'ein ganz verrückter Kerl', and that his

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motives for engaging in the Wallenberg case could be found both in a 'burning hatred against the Soviet Union' and in the prospect of economic gains.[101]

It can at this point, however, not be established with certainty whether Böhm should be understood as having acted solely on his own initiative, if he was what Bittman would refer to as an 'unwitting agent', unknowingly being manipulated by Soviet intelligence to provide the Swedes with disinformation, or whether he should even be considered an agent of the USSR. In 2003 the Swedish researcher Wilhelm Agrell went as far as accusing Böhm of having provided the Soviet intelligence with covert and sensitive information about Wallenberg's mission and thereby betrayed him to the Soviets.[102] Agrell's hypothesis was founded on the fact that the British and US cryptologists decoding intercepted encrypted Soviet cables had suggested that an informant to the Soviet NKGB *rezidentura* in Stockholm, operating under the codename Orestes, was identical to Böhm. According to a cable of 10 January 1942 a person by the name of 'Bem' should henceforth to be referred to as 'Orestes'.[103] Bem could, as noted by the cryptologists of Venona, be a Russian transcription for Böhm and, judging from the encrypted declassified diplomatic correspondence, in the very few cables reporting on talks with Böhm, he is always referred to as Bem.[104]

It is a documented fact that in June 1944 Böhm furnished British intelligence agents in Stockholm with detailed information on Wallenberg's mission to Hungary, which included remarks on the somewhat unusual institutional arrangement involving both Sweden and the United States. Given that he maintained intelligence contacts with the British and even bothered to brief them on Wallenberg, that he possibly (or even likely) is identical to Orestes, and that the British at this point were in an alliance with the USSR against Nazi Germany, which had occupied his country of origin since March 1944, it seems hardly far-fetched to hold that he or possibly his British intelligence contacts shared this information with the Russians.[105] Establishing this with certainty can, however, only be done once the Russians allow for an independent review of the hundreds of still classified encrypted cables that were exchanged between the NKGB in Stockholm and its headquarters in Moscow. These cables, potentially of crucial interest to the Wallenberg case, were not among the ones declassified in 2011.[106] As for Böhm's appearance in May 1946, one may note that Wallenberg's brother-in-law, Gunnar Lagergren, noted in a letter to Grafström on 5 April 1946 - that is, in the wake of the information on the three named Soviet soldiers escorting Wallenberg - that 'Böhm had been told by Communists in Hungary that Wallenberg's Soviet-Russian escort had disappeared, just as Wallenberg himself'.[107] This statement, which shows that Böhm received information from Communist sources in Hungary, indicates that he should possibly be conceptualised as an unwitting agent rather than an agent acting on instructions from Moscow.

Regardless of this, Böhm's messages were undoubtedly absorbed into the UD machinery. The Kossuth broadcast was referred to in several UD memos on the case; Chargé d'Affaires of the Swedish mission in Moscow, Ulf Barck-Holst, referred to the interview in the *Stockholmstidningen* in one of his cables[108]; Erlander referred to the Kossuth message in his address before Parliament in November 1946; and Westman's report from his talk with Böhm was sent by courier to the Swedish legations in Budapest and Moscow.[109] We also know that Böhm enjoyed the Foreign Minister's confidence. Grafström describes in his diary the following episode that took place on 18 June 1947:

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> Undén has asked me to write a review regarding international matters before a meeting with the foreign affairs advisory committee that is scheduled for the week after midsummer. I will obviously do this but I fear that I will not be able to write anything that will make him happy. Just recently, we had a talk about the last case of Soviet fait-accompli politics in Eastern Europe. It turned out that his understanding of developments in Hungary was in complete harmony with the Russian propaganda. It was the [Hungarian] minister Böhm who had provided him with his knowledge, quite scary.[110]

The extent to which the Foreign Minister listened or even talked with Böhm on the matter of Wallenberg is, however, unknown. Grafström was under all circumstances the one responsible for the Wallenberg case in UD at the time and he was evidently quite hesitant.

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Were there additional cases of Soviet disinformation?

Aside from Böhm, the Polish citizen Irieczenko (alias Mieczyslaw/Szmichystow Stachoviak) and the Romanian Ghiorghiu Vas - both appearing with false information regarding Wallenberg's fate in 1947 and 1948 (Stachowiak) and 1951 (Vas) - have been named as acting on the orders of Soviet or East European intelligence organisations with the purpose of misleading the Swedes.[111] Stachowiak, who appeared in Sweden in 1943–4 and 1945 under different identities, later approached the Swedish legations first in Warsaw (1947), claiming that Wallenberg had managed to escape from Soviet imprisonment and was now, seriously wounded from a gunshot, together with Polish partisans in southern Poland[112] and then, half a year later, in Prague (1948) making similar claims.[113] The Romanian Ghiorghiu Vas (1951) claimed that Wallenberg was imprisoned in Romania.[114] There are, however, good reasons to hold that neither of these two was acting on Soviet orders, nor were they even unwitting agents of the USSR. First and foremost, both Stachowiak and Vas held that Wallenberg was alive. Their messages thus contradicted the official Soviet position on the matter and there seems little or no reason for the Soviets to disseminate consciously information to this effect at this point: in the case of Stachowiak in between the Vyshinski note and the *Novoie vremia* article; and in the case of Vas at a point when the Soviets had all the reason in the world to be quite content with the fact that the Swedes had not come back to them at all for four years. Moreover, as is evident from the Swedish police file on Stachowiak, his record as an innovative survivalist is quite indisputable.[115]

There are, however, two other informants whose approaches before the UD are worth dwelling upon from the perspective of *aktivnyie meropriiatiia*. On 6 December 1946, Petri, in a three-page memo, reported that the former 'General Secretary' of the Red Cross in Budapest, immediately under Langlet and very well acquainted with Wallenberg'[116], Alexander Kasser, had visited UD and told the following: that he had been arrested by the Soviet military on 15 January 1945 and interrogated by the NKVD, which had voiced some suspicions regarding the Swedish Red Cross. Kasser had told his interrogators that Langlet and Wallenberg had been protecting Jews and that both had been sentenced to death by the Arrow Cross. The NKVD had, however, not asked any specific questions regarding Wallenberg. On 10 February, Kasser had heard a rumour that there was a diplomat ('*sogar ein Diplomat*') in the Soviet POW camp in Gödöllö, which Kasser, however, considered to be a highly unlikely scenario. Instead, he was convinced that Wallenberg had been killed by a

bomb somewhere along the road to Debrecen: '[He] knew of hundreds of people who at this particular point in time had been killed in this way.'

> Kasser did not believe in any double dealings by the Russians. The Russians were probably happy to have established contact with him - the Dekanozov message undoubtedly pointed in that direction. [. . .] Kasser was thus 'one hundred percent' sure that Wallenberg was no longer alive and that he with all certainty, just like so many other people in these days, had been killed by a bomb on the road between Budapest and Debrecen.[117]

As regards the timing of this message, one may note that it appeared with the UD about one and a half weeks after Erlander's presentation before the Riksdag (27 November), UD's instruction to the Swedish mission in Moscow to renew its approaches to Soviet authorities regarding Wallenberg (28 November)[118], and Böhm's above-mentioned visit to Westman (28 November). December 1946 and January 1947 were indisputably the most intensive phases when it came to Swedish activities regarding Wallenberg for the entire period 1945–52.[119] The appearance of Kasser's message at this particular point, just like Böhm's, must therefore be considered interesting from the perspective of timing.

This holds also for the conditions under which it was delivered. According to a short note by Grafström, a Mr Paulish of the Hungarian Export office had phoned him at 2.30 p.m. on 30 November asking whether UD would be interested in learning about Kasser's views concerning Wallenberg's fate. Paulish had also added 'that Kasser was of the opinion that Wallenberg had been killed by the Germans' and 'that there were no chances that Wallenberg was in Russia'.[120] The way in which UD was approached here is undoubtedly of interest. Just like Böhm, Paulish was a Hungarian government official. His dead-certain statements on Wallenberg's fate are intriguing and so also is the fact that before Kasser had had the chance to speak for himself, Paulish had placed an opinion of Wallenberg's fate in his mouth, in effect leaving no room for any other message.[121] Looking at the more overarching pattern there is, as pointed out above, no doubt that Kasser's message matches well with Böhm's earlier appearances. When it comes to the consequences, one may note that it was referred to in a short memo by Petri of 14 January 1947 and in Ambassador Erik Sjöborg's major analysis of all the testimonies of April 1951.[122]

The next informant of interest here approached the Swedes half a year later, in early June 1947. On 3 June, the Swedish Envoy in Moscow, Sohlman, reported that he had spent the weekend on official business in Leningrad together with his daughter, that his daughter had shared a bus with members of some official Hungarian delegations to Leningrad, and that a Hungarian, allegedly a secretary to one such delegation, had told her that he had a friend who had seen Wallenberg's corpse in a Soviet POW camp in Gödöllö. According to the friend, Wallenberg had been incarcerated in the camp:

> [Wallenberg] had referred to his status as a diplomat but no consideration had been taken to this fact. After a while he had died from a disease whose character the Hungarian had been able to determine. [He was unwilling to say more on the matter since it was sensitive due to Wallenberg's diplomatic status]. It was however clear that the Russians were unable to determine which persons had died in the Gödöllö camp.[123]

Two days later, Sohlman reported that he had managed to get hold of the Hungarian through the head of the Hungarian national bank, Jankovich, who happened to be in

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Moscow. His name was Litpe and he was allegedly a secretary of the Hungarian Minister of Finance. Litpe confirmed his earlier statement and added that not only had his friend witnessed Wallenberg's death, he had also been able to determine its causes: famine and 'a rupture to [Wallenberg's] intestines'. Jankovich had, according to Sohlman, added:

> He felt that this trace led directly to someone who had in fact seen Wallenberg after 17 January [...]. The death rate in Gödöllö had been approximately 25 percent and [both Litpe and Jankovich] were of the opinion that the Russians in fact were unable - with a very few exceptions - to ascertain who died in this transitory camp.[124]

The content of this message is clearly very much in line with Böhm's and Kasser's; it even refers, just like Kasser did, to the Gödöllö camp. The timing of the message may at first glance seem a bit unexpected. The Swedes had made no new approaches after Hägglöf's talk with Novikov on 30 January 1947.[125] One may, however, note that Wallenberg's half brother, Guy von Dardel, during a visit to the United States in April and May, had put in a lot of effort trying to evoke US interest in the matter. He had met with several officials and written a letter to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the US Senate, Arthur H. Vandenberg, who in turn had requested Acting Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, to engage himself with the matter. Moreover, the journalist Dorothy Thompson published an open letter to the former Secretary of Trade, Henry Wallace, to address the matter with the Soviets, (which he also did, as mentioned above, with the Soviet Envoy to the United States, Nikolai Novikov, on 7 July 1947).[126] The Soviets were well aware of von Dardel's efforts. The above-mentioned *Novoie vremia* article made the following comments:

> [E]arly last year [i.e. 1947], Swedish right wing newspaper suddenly gave this regrettable but by no means exceptional occurrence in wartime conditions a sensational, even provocatory character. Fables about the 'Soviet secret police' which is allegedly holding Wallenberg in its fearsome clutches were persistently disseminated by the press. It is of interest to note the circulation of these absurd inventions in print coincided with a visit to the United States of Wallenberg's step-brother, an engineer named von Dardel. [...] Events showed soon enough that what was in question was less a mystery than a matter of the vilest provocations. Dardel wrote to Truman asking him 'to make inquiries with the Russian authorities about the fate of Wallenberg'. The outcome of the appeal turned out to be somewhat discouraging for both Dardel and his backers. Judging by everything he was asked to substantiate his provocatory claim with facts of some kind which would have given some reason to believe that the Soviet authorities were implicated in Wallenberg's disappearance. But Dardel could not produce anything of the kind. [...] The Soviet public views such provocatory endeavors with profound indignation and hopes that Swedish democratic circles will draw the correct conclusions, giving a merited rebuff to the despicable activities of the Swedish 'step-brothers' of the American warmongers.[127]

When it comes to the conditions one may note that, for the third time, UD was approached by official representatives of the Hungarian government. Looking at the consequences one may note that it was transmitted to the Swedish mission in Budapest with an instruction to try to trace the informant.[128] The mission, however, never managed to trace Litpe and have his testimony verified.[129] When by March 1951 UD tried to trace Jankovich, it turned out that he was serving a prison sentence for having maintained illegal contacts with foreigners.[130]

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Concluding remarks

Did the Soviets provide the Swedes with disinformation? The answer to this question is undoubtedly yes. The Vyshinskii note, the articles in *Novoie vremia* and *Képes Figelö*, and the Nidosi process are all indisputable examples of that. Did the Soviets try to channel disinformation to the Swedes by way of other channels, for example the witnesses? Is it the case that the Vyshinskii note was in fact, as noted above, an extraordinary measure to correct a campaign of disinformation that had failed to achieve its goals? In light of the correspondence between a number of the witness accounts and critical moments in the history of the Wallenberg case, as well as the rather remarkable conditions under which some messages were delivered, it is hard to escape the impression that the Soviets were anxious to have the Swedes believe that Wallenberg was dead well before the deliverance of the Vyshinskii note. This in turn seems to indicate that they, at a very early point, possibly already by March 1945 when the first such message arrived, had decided never to let Wallenberg return alive, or, at the very least, construct an option that would allow for such a decision.

It is therefore interesting to note that the former Wehrmacht soldier of Bohemian-German origin, Otto Prade, has provided a very interesting testimony that arguably supports the notion that some form of decision regarding Wallenberg's fate may have been taken as early as March 1945. Prade sought shelter at the Swedish legation at Gyopar utca during the battle for Budapest and he witnessed the Soviet Army's repeated plunder of the building (11–13 February 1945). Once the Soviets had established control over Buda he was arrested and interrogated by the NKVD. He was questioned in great detail regarding the Swedish mission, in particular 'its activities in favor of the Hungarians and the Germans'. By late March, during an interrogation, a Soviet officer had asked him to tell all he knew of Wallenberg's activities. When Prade said that he only knew that Wallenberg had been protecting persecuted peoples, in particular Jews, from being arrested by the Gestapo and the Arrow Cross, 'everybody in the room had burst out in loud laughter':

> A Russian took his gun, pointed at my forehead and said that I still had a few minutes to tell the truth about Wallenberg. Again all I could say regarding Wallenberg was only that I had heard that he had helped people who were persecuted by the Nazis and the Arrow Cross. [. . .] I was then brought into a neighboring room. [..] Then I was brought back in again and the [interrogator] asked me if I knew anything of the sum of money that Wallenberg had received from Himmler for his activities. It had been proved that Wallenberg was in fact affiliated with the Gestapo. As evidence he told me that the mission for several months had been kept under surveillance and that the telephone of the Swedes had been tapped. [. . .] On the following day a Russian Major had told me that 'diesen Vogel' [he meant Wallenberg] had been so carefully dealt with that he would never again be able to issue and passports or ever see Hungary or Sweden again.[131]

The correspondence in time between Prade's testimony and the appearance of misleading information from Szeben, Földes, Langlet, and Böhm is undoubtedly interesting and arguably lends further weight to the notion of these messages as consciously designed to mislead the Swedish government. Since the Swedes nonetheless kept asking for Wallenberg it seems reasonable to understand the appearance of the Vyshinskii note through the same prism as the Soviet attempt to have German guilt for Katyn judicially pinned down at Nuremberg, that is, as an extraordinary measure finally to make sure that the message got through. That the Soviets ever seriously contemplated releasing Wallenberg through an exchange in return for one or more

Soviet citizens in Sweden (for example, defected sailors), as has been suggested over the years, also seems unlikely in light of such a campaign.[132]

In 1991 the Swedish and Russian governments agreed to establish a joint working group consisting of diplomats, archivists, and analysts with the stated purpose of going into the depths of the Wallenberg case. When the group after nine years of archival reviews both in Russia and elsewhere concluded its work in 2001, the Russians and the Swedes presented separate reports. The Russian report which, as noted by the Eliasson Commission, leaves a lot to be said on a number of aspects[133], laid down that 'thousands of people were interned in Soviet prisons, including prominent foreigners [. . .]. [Wallenberg's] case was one in a long series of "ordinary" cases and it was handled in a corresponding manner'.[134] The Vyshinskii note alone is proof that such a conclusion is incorrect.

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Notes

1. The Swedish Working Group's Report, *Raoul Wallenberg: Redovisning från den svensk-ryska arbetsgruppen*, Aktstycken utgivna av Utrikesdepartementet, ny serie, UD II:52, (Stockholm, 2000). On encrypted cables, see J. Matz, 'Cables in Cipher, the Raoul Wallenberg Case and Swedish-Soviet Diplomatic Communication 1944–47', *Scandinavian Journal of History*, xxxviii, no. 3 (2013), 344–66
2. The Soviet Foreign Ministry, Narodnyi kommissariat innostrannykh del, (NKID), established in 1923 was renamed in March 1946 as Ministerstvo innostrannykh del (MID).
3. Dekanozov's note is filed in Russian Foreign Ministry's archive (Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii, AVPRF), (f)ond 0140, (op)is' 30, (d)elo 10, (p)ortfel' 129, (l)ist 1, and letter from Söderblom to Stockholm, Riksarkivet [The Swedish National Archive] (hereafter given as RA.) Utrikesdepartementet [The Swedish Foreign Ministry] (hereafter given as UD.) HP 80 Ea, nr. 22, 17 Jan. 1945.
4. Wallenberg was interrogated on 8 Feb. and 28 April 1945, 17 July (together with Langfelder) and 30 Aug. 1946 and 11 March 1947. Langfelder was interrogated on 8 Feb. and 10 April 1945, 3 July 1946, and 17 July (together with Wallenberg). It may well be, however, that they may have been interrogated on more occasions. *Working Group's Report*, 74–6.
5. One may note that Smoltsov spelt Wallenberg's name with one 'l'. This is an intriguing exception from all other Soviet documents on his case, where his name is always spelled with two 'l's'.
6. Swedish diplomats approached the Soviets on behalf of Wallenberg during talks with, or via letters to, Soviet officials on 12 and 20 March, 25 and 28 April, 18 May, 7 June, 3 and 30 Nov., 22 and 26 Dec. (all in 1945), 26 and 27 Jan., 9 Feb., 30 April, 11 and 15 June, 12 and 25 July, 12, 13 and at some point in late December (all in 1946), 13 and 30 Jan., 10 April, 12 June and 15 July (all in 1947). All reports are filed in RA. UD, P 2 EuI (i.e., the Raoul Wallenberg file).
7. On Soviet and Swedish interpretations on the speech-acts of 'the other', see *the Working Group's Report*, 83–98, the report of the Commission on the Swedish government's handling of the Raoul Wallenberg case (the Eliasson Commission), *Ett diplomatiskt misslyckande* [A Failure of Diplomacy], SOU 2003:18 (Stockholm, 2003), 365–408 and 455–83 and J. Matz, 'Analogical Reasoning and the Diplomacy of the Raoul Wallenberg Case 1945–7', *International History Review*, DOI:10.1080/07075332.2014.918556.
8. As a result of individual parliamentarians' interest in the matter, primarily MP Elis Håstad, Erlander was summoned to answer before the Chamber in November 1946 and Undén in July 1947. Almost half of Erlander's address was taken up by testimonies and UD's investigations as a result of these (P 2 EuI, 27 Nov. 1946). Three quarters of Undén's address about half a year later was taken up by similar information (P 2 EuI, 1 July 1947).

9. This study is founded on a content analysis of all witness accounts 1945–52. All testimonies are filed in RA UD, P 2 EuI.
10. E. Boheman, *På vakt* (Stockholm, 1964), 22–32.
11. *A Failure of Diplomacy*, 518–28.
12. RA. UD. P 2 EuI, 18 Aug. 1947. Ferenc Szalasi, the leader of the Hungarian Fascist movement *Arrow Cross*.
13. 'Pis'mo zam. ministra innostrannykh del SSSR A. Ia, Vyshinskogo ministru gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR V. S. Abakumovu', 7 July 1947 (photocopy in RA UD, P 2 EuI, 21 Nov. 1991). On the internal Soviet handling of the matter throughout the spring of 1947, see the memos ('Dokladnyie zapiski') by Vetrov for Molotov (8 Feb. 1947), by Vetrov for Vyshinskii (2 April 1947), and by Vyshinskii for Molotov (14 May 1947), f. 06, op. 9, p. 81, d. 1280. Photocopies in RA. UD. P 2 EuI, 21 Nov. 1991.
14. 'Dokladnaia zapiska A. Ia. Vyshinskogo V. M. Molotovu'), f. 06, op. 9, p. 81, d. 1280, 14 May 1947, photocopy in RA UD, P 2 EuI, 21 Nov. 1991.
15. Hägglöf succeeded Söderblom in July 1946 and was succeeded by Sohlman in April 1947.
16. 'Zapis' besedy so shvedskim poslannikom G. Chegglefom', 30 Jan. 1947, in AVP RF, f. 0140, op. 38, d. 6, p. 144, ll. 1–2. These speculations were, however, not mentioned in the Swedish report from this meeting. See Letter to Undén in RA. UD, Hp 80, nr. 80, 30 Jan. 1947.
17. This version also appears in Vetrov's memo of 8 February for Molotov. It has, however, been crossed out and replaced with a text stating that 'according to information received from comrade Fedotov, Wallenberg is at the disposal of the MGB. Comrade Fedotov has promised to inform you regarding the reasons for the arrest of Wallenberg and present ideas regarding the future handling of this question.' See memo by Vetrov for Molotov, 8 Feb. 1947, photocopy in RA UD, P 2 EuI, 21 Nov. 1991.
18. Cable from Soviet legation, Stockholm, 23 Aug. 1947, AVP RF, f. 059, op. 18, d. 351, p. 54, nr. 942. Undén's presentation before Parliament was given 1 July 1947.
19. RA. UD. P 2 EuI, 'P.M. by Petri', 8 April 1948.
20. The Italian diplomat Claudio de Mohr provided UD in December 1951 with a detailed testimony of his tenure in Lubianka where he maintained contact with Wallenberg. De Mohr's testimony was instrumental in having Undén demand the return of Wallenberg in February 1952. RA. UD. P 2 EuI, 3 Dec. 1951.
21. On earlier analyses and research on the Raoul Wallenberg case, see, for example, Ambassador Rune Nyström's investigation, 'Utredning rörande Wallenberg-ärendet', RA. UD. P 2 EuI, 1986; H. Carlbäck-Isotalo, 'Glasnost and the Opening up of Soviet Archives. Time to Conclude the Raoul Wallenberg Case?' *Scandinavian Journal of History*, xvii (1992), 175–207; *The Working Group's Report*; *A Failure of Diplomacy;* and S. Berger, 'Stuck in Neutral: The Reasons Behind Sweden's Passivity in the Raoul Wallenberg Case' (2004), available at http://www.raoul-wallenberg.eu/wp-content/uploads/2005/08/Stuck_ 25Oct 05 .pdf.
22. RA. UD. P 2 EuI, 8 April 1948.
23. Cable from Soviet legation, Stockholm, 16 July, nr 725 and 17 July nr 728, 729 (one cable) (both 1947) in AVP RF, f. 059, op. 18, p. 54, d. 351.
24. R. Philipp, *Raoul Wallenberg, diplomat, kämpe, samarit* (Stockholm, 1946).
25. Cable from Soviet legation, Stockholm, 10 April 1947, AVP RF, f. 059, op. 18, p. 54, d. 350, 392–4.
26. J. Matz, 'Sweden, the USSR and the Early Cold War 1944–1947: De-Classified Encrypted Cables Shed New Light on Soviet Diplomatic Reporting about Sweden in the Aftermath of World War II', *Cold War History*, Vol. 15, issue 1, 2015, 27–48.
27. Pis'mo A. Ia. Vyshinskogo V. C. Abakumovu, 22 July 1947, Photocopy in RA P 2 EuI, 21 Nov. 1991.
28. RA. UD. P 2 EuI, 10 Dec. 1947.
29. 'Spotlight on Slander: The Raoul Wallenberg Legend', *Novoie vremia* (English edition, *New Times*), nr. 4, 21 Jan. 1948, 23. Wallenberg was nominated on 10 Dec. 1947. See P 2 EuI.
30. The Norwegian prize committee declined to award the prize in 1948 since there was 'no suitable living candidate' that year.

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31. RA. UD. P 2 EuI, nr. 55, 22 Oct. See also memo by Anger of 26 Oct. 1948 (in P 2 EuI).
32. 'Ji fölte meg Wallenberget?', *Képes Figelö*, 23 Oct. 1948. The article was sent to Stockholm supplementing a letter from the Swedish legation, Budapest, to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, in RA. UD. P 2 EuI, nr. 256, 25 Oct. 1948.
33. In addition to Feller and Meier, the Soviets also imprisoned the Swiss diplomats Boris Bryner with the Swiss consulate in Harbin, China, and the two consular officers Brandenberg and Felber with the Swiss consulate in the city of Elbing (Elblag) in Poland (former Germany).
34. RA. UD. P 2 Eu, nr. 29, 15 March 1946.
35. RA. UD. HP 1 Cs, nr. 182 and nr. 207, 31 May and 18 June 1945. See also letter to Undén, RA. UD. HP 1 Cs, nr. 379, 24 Sep. 1945.
36. On the Soviet campaign regarding Switzerland, see letters to Undén in RA, UD, HP 1 Cs, nr. 262 and nr. 333, 21 June and 13 Aug. 1945.
37. See for example RA. UD. HP 1 Cs, nr. 207, 15 June 1945.
38. See for example *Working Group's Report* 6 and *A Failure of Diplomacy*, 479–83.
39. af Sandeberg was captured by the Soviets in Berlin in June 1945, incarcerated in the USSR for about a year and released on 22 March 1946. On Soviet information on af Sandeberg, see letter from Söderblom to Undén, RA. UD. HP 80 B, nr. 474, 15 Aug. 1945.
40. On the Katyn massacre and Soviet disinformation, see A.M. Cienciala, N.S. Lebedeva, and W. Materski (eds), *Katyn: a Crime without Punishment* (New Haven, 2007); M. Kramer, 'What is Distinctive about Katyn? The Massacres in Context', *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*, xliv, no. 3 (2012), 569–76; A. Paul, *Katyn: Stalin's Massacre and the Triumph of Truth* (DeKalb, 2010); G. Sanford, *Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940* (Milton Park, 2005); M. Sterio, 'Katyn Forest Massacre: Of Genocide, State Lies, and Secrecy', *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*, lxiv, no. 3 (2012), 615–31; and V. Zaslavsky, *Class Cleansing* (New York, 2008). On British and US unwillingness to have the matter investigated, see R. Szymczak, 'Cold War Crusader: Arthur Bliss Lane and the Private Committee to Investigate the Katyn Massacre, 1949–1952', *Polish American Studies*, lxvii, no. 2 (2010), 5–33.
41. Zaslavsky, *Class Cleansing*, 53; Paul holds there were a mere 395 survivors from the three camps; Paul, *Katyn*, 173.
42. Zaslavsky, *Class Cleansing*, 53. On the Soviet stonewalling and Stalin's statement before Anders that the officers might have fled to Manchuria, see Kramer, 'What is Distinctive about Katyn?,' 571 and Paul, *Katyn*, 177–83.
43. Zaslavsky, *Class Cleansing*, 55–6.
44. Zaslavsky, *Class Cleansing*, 61–4. Sterio, 'Katyn Forest Massacre', 621–2.
45. Zaslavsky, *Class Cleansing*, 74–80.
46. C. Andrew and V. Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West*, (London, 1999), 292.
47. See for example K. Rentola, 'Intelligence and Stalin's Two Crucial Decisions in the Winter War 1939–40', *International History Review*, xxxv, no. 5 (2013), 1089–112.
48. Zaslavsky's book cited above is good example. As for the Katyn case, it is a fact that documents revealing the process of deciding on and carrying out the murders have been made accessible for research. Few, if any, documents providing details on internal Soviet calculations regarding the strategy and implementation of the disinformation campaign seem, however, to have been released.
49. The foreign security service, *Sluzhba vneshnei razvedki*, SVR. Both Russian and Swedish representatives of the Swedish–Russian working relationship were granted access to files of the former KGB archive. See *Working Group's Report*, 16–19. One may also note that former SVR officer Lev F. Sotskov has published a book containing material from the SVR archive. (*Pribaltika i geopolitika 1935-45: Rassekrechenye dokumenty sluzhby vneshnei razvedki Rossiiskoi Federatsii* [Moscow, 2010]).
50. T. Boghardt, 'Operation Infektion: Soviet Bloc Intelligence and its AIDS Disinformation Campaign', *Studies in Intelligence*, liii, no. 4 (2009).
51. Boghardt, 'Operation Infektion', 4–5.
52. Ibid., 5–6.

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53. L. Bittman, *The KGB and Soviet Disinformation. An Insider's View* (Washington, 1985), 49. Bittman was formerly deputy director of the Czechoslovakian Disinformation Department.
54. Zaslavsky, *Class Cleansing*, 102–3.
55. K. Ungváry, *The Siege of Budapest. 100 Days in World War II* (London, 2002), 152–166.
56. Boghardt, 'Operation Infektion', 6.
57. Ibid., 6
58. C. Andrews and O. Gordievskii, *KBG: The Inside Story* (London, 1990), 541.
59. Zaslavsky, *Class Cleansing*, 80.
60. Bittman, *The KGB and Soviet Disinformation*, 50–2.
61. 'Zapis' besedy s vremennym poverennym v dela Shvedskoi missii v Moskve Bark-Cholstom', 24 July 1946 in AVPRF, f. 0140, op. 31, p. 7, p. 133, l. 26–27. Barck-Holst's report in RA. UD. P 2 EuI, 25 July 1946, nr. 150. According to Barck-Holst's report his Soviet interlocutor Alexander N. Abramov said he had read af Sandeberg's articles. See also 'Raoul Wallenberg lever – vistas i Sovjet', *Stockholmstidningen*, 28 June 1946.
62. Cable from UD to Söderblom in RA. UD. P 2 EuI, nr. 36, 3 March 1945.
63. Söderblom's cable is filed in RA. UD. P 57, 5 March 1945. Reuterswärd's reply is filed in RA. UD. P 57, 7 March 1945.
64. *A Failure of Diplomacy*, 231–3.
65. P 2 EuI, nr. 41, 8 March 1945.
66. RA. UD. Hp 80 Ea, 9 March 1945.
67. RA. UD. P 2 Eu, nr. 44, 2 March 1944.
68. RA. UD. P 57, 11 Feb. 1945.
69. RA. UD. P 57, 14 March 1945.
70. Földes' message did not find its way into research regarding Wallenberg until the Eliasson Commission dug up in 2003 a previously unknown dossier of the Bucharest mission's archive in which Földes' information, along with some other important details, were filed. See *A Failure of Diplomacy*, 248, 329.
71. See Langlet's account, 'Berättelse Budapest-Istanbul' in RA UD, P 2 Eu, 16 June 1945, 5.
72. Reuterswärd's telegramme, P 2 Eu, nr. 9, 2 March 1945.
73. Arkadii Vaksberg, *Aleksandra Kollontai*, (Smedjebacken, Norstedts förlag AB),1996, 304.
74. See *A Failure of Diplomacy*, 227–58 and Matz, 'Analogical Reasoning'.
75. RA. UD. Hp 80 Ea, 11 March 1945, nr. 164, RA UD. P 2 Eu, 12 March 1945, nr. 175, RA. UD. HP 80 Ea, 17 March 1945, nr. 183, RA. UD. P 2 Eu, 27 March 1945, nr. 64.
76. RA. UD. P2 Eu, nr. 81, 29 March 1945.
77. RA. UD. P 57, 28 March 1945, see also *A Failure of Diplomacy*, 256.
78. Letter from Langlet, 28 March 1945 in RA. UD. P 57.
79. RA. UD. HP 1 Eu, nr. 233, 14 April 1945.
80. 'Priem shvedskogo poslannika Sederblioma', 25 April 1945, in AVPRF, f. 012, op. 6, p. 89, d. 349, l. 10, RA. UD. P 2 Eu, nr. 684, 1 Dec. 1945. 'Zapis' besedy so shvedskim poslannikom Sederbliomom', 26 Dec. 1946, in AVPRF, f. 06, op. 7, p. 52, d. 858, ll. 89-194. 'Zapis' besedy so shvedskim poslannikom Sederbliomom', 9 March 1946, in AVPRF, f. 0140, op 31 d., 7 p. 133, ll. 6–7.
81. See for example Söderblom's letter to Sahlin, RA UD, P 2 EuI, nr. 41, 14 Aug. 1945.
82. Sven Grafström, *Anteckningar 1945–1954* (Stockholm, 1989), 622, 760, 767.
83. AVPRF, f. 059, op. 15, p. 67, d. 388, nr.1571, 1572, 29 June 1945.
84. Letter from Chernyshev to Molotov, AVPRF, f. 0140, op. 31, d. 5, p. 133, ll. 14–20, 30 March 1946.
85. Grafström's cable to Söderblom of 26 April seems to voice some degree of discontent with Söderblom's unwillingness to deal with the matter (RA. UD. P 2 Eu, nr. 97, 26 April 1946).
86. On Böhm as a provider of disinformation, see B. Schiller, *Varför ryssarna tog Raoul Wallenberg* (Stockholm, 1991), 151–4; *A Failure of Diplomacy*, 589, and Agrell *Venona: spåren från ett underrättelsekrig* (Lund, 2003), 295–301.
87. Letter from Böhm to de Geer, RA. UD. P 2 EuI, nr. 165, 15 March 1945.

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88. Böhm's report is filed in NARA, 840.48 Refugees/6333, 2187, 17 June 1944 section one, two and three.
89. On Böhm's codename see Lauer's undated memo on the recruitment of Wallenberg for the Budapest mission in Raoul Wallenbergföreningens arkiv 1:6 (Kálman Lauers arkiv, RA).
90. *A Failure of Diplomacy*, 231–3.
91. On 16 December Eichmann was reported to have said that he intended to have 'the Jewish dog Wallenberg shot', RA. UD. HP 21 Eu, nr. 599, 16 Dec. 1944. UD instructed the Swedish Envoy in Berlin, Arvid Richert, to take the matter up with the German Auswärtiges Amts (RA. UD. HP 1 Ct, nr. 624 16 Dec. 1944). See also Richert's report in RA. UD. P 2 Eu, nr. 1778, 23 Dec. 1944.
92. See Anger's (nr. 100, 17 Feb. 1948 Danielsson's (nr. 150, 29 Sep. 1947) and von Mezey's (nr. 133, 4 Sep. 1947) letters to UD in RA. UD. R 20 Eu.
93. 'Bericht von Otto Prade', Köln 15 Aug. 1950 in P 2 EuI.
94. On 19 May 1945, Chernyshev cabled Moscow on Swedish press reports on the Soviet plunder of the Swedish legation in Budapest (AVP RF, f. 059, op. 15, p. 66, d. 387, nr. 1170, 1171). On 23 May Dekanozov asked the General Lieutenant N. V. Slavin whether these reports were true (AVP RF, f. 0140, op. 31, d. 2, p. 133, l. 1). On 24 May, the Soviet military confirmed that the plunder had taken place (AVP RF, f. 0140, op. 30, d. 10, p. 129, l. 3.)
95. 'Svensk bragd i Ungern', *Dagens nyheter*, 6 March 1945.
96. 'Raoul Wallenberg mördades med två ryska officerare', *Stockholmstidningen*, 28 May 1946.
97. RA. UD. P 2 Eu, 26 Jan. 1946, nr. 151.
98. RA. UD. P 2 Eu, 12 Feb. 1946, nr. 599.
99. RA. UD. P 2 Eu 10 March 1946, nr. 158.
100. Judging from existing Soviet documentation the Swedish requests were only forwarded to other Soviet governmental authorities (MGB, Ministerstvo gosudarstvennyi besopasnosti [Ministry of State Security] and MVD, Ministerstvo vnutrennykh del' [Interior Ministry], GUPVI,Glavnoe upravlenie po delam voennoplennykh i internirovannykh [Main Administration for Affairs of Prisoners of War and Internees] on five occasions (28 Nov. 1945, 3 Feb., 20 March, 17 July, and (sometime late) November 1946. Photocopies of these requests are available in RA. UD. P 2 EuI, 21 Nov. 1991.
101. See Westman's memcon, 29 Nov. 1946, in RA. UD. P 2 EuI.
102. See Agrell and 'Ungersk spion förrådde Wallenberg', *Svenska dagbladet*, 12 May 2003.
103. This cable is available online at http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/venona/1942/10jan_orestes.pdf
104. See cables 4 June 1946, AVP RF, f. 059, op. 16, p. 73, d. 460, nr. 725, and 20 Dec. 1946, AVP RF, f. 059, op. 16, p. 57, d. 463, nr. 1742,1743).
105. The briefing is filed in the National Archives of the United Kingdom (NAUK) FO/188/463, 3/001. The report is also available in the Swedish Foreign Ministry's Archive (RA UD, P 2 EuI, 3 Jan. 1997).
106. Matz, 'Cables in Cipher', 357–9.
107. Letter from Lagergren to Grafström, RA UD, P 2 Eu, nr. 163, 5 April 1946.
108. RA. UD. P 2 EuI, nr. 257, 8 Dec 1946.
109. RA. UD. P 2 EuI nr. 1667 and 1668, 30 Nov. 1946.
110. Grafström, *Anteckningar 1945–1954*, 811.
111. Philipp held that Stachowiak was a Soviet agent. See RA. UD. P 2 EuI, 18 March 1951. Engfeldt reached the same conclusion regarding Stachowiak. He also held that Vas was with the Romanian secret police. 'P.M. angående Raoul Wallenberg', P 2 EuI, 30 Jan. 1952.
112. RA. UD. P 2 EuI, 6 Nov. 1947.
113. RA. UD. P 2 EuI, 19 April 1948.
114. The investigation regarding Vas generated an abundance of memos and reports. See RA. UD. P 2 EuI, 6 July 1951 and 7 Sep. 1951.
115. On Stachowiak, see J. Matz, 'Intelligence and Disinformation in World War II and the Early Cold War, Stachowiak *alias* Drauschke *alias* Donoa, his Intelligence Activities in

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Sweden and Denmark and the Raoul Wallenberg Case', *Journal of Intelligence History*, xiv, no. 1 (2015), 16–37.

116. According to a handwritten note on Petri's report, Langlet had appointed many General Secretaries in his organization. Langlet makes no mention of Kasser in his book *Verk och dagar i Budapest* (Stockholm, 1946).
117. 'P.M.' by Petri, P 2 EuI, 6 Dec. 1946.
118. RA. UD. P 2 EuI, nr. 1144, 28 Nov. 1946.
119. Throughout December 1946 Barck-Holst met with former Soviet Envoy to Sweden Alexandra Kollontai, 8 and 27 December (RA. UD. P 2 EuI, nr. 258), the acting head of the 5th Scandinavian Department of MID, Ivan G. Sysoiev, 12 Dec. (RA. UD. P 2 EuI, nr. 263, 12 Dec. and RA, P 2 EuI, 12 Dec. 1946), the Head of the *Sovinform Bureau* (and former Deputy Foreign Minister) Solomon Lozovskii, 13 Dec. (RA. UD. P 2 EuI, nr. 263, 13 Dec. and RA. UD. P 2 EuI, nr. 637, 14 Dec. 1946). Moreovoer, Barck-Holst met with Novikov on 14 Jan. (RA. UD. P 2 EuI, nr. 20, 14 Jan. 1947) and Hägglöf with Novikov on 30 Jan. ('Zapis' besedy so shvedskim poslannikom G. Chegglefom', 30 Jan. 1947, in AVP RF, f. 0140, op. 38, d. 6, p. 144, ll. 1-2 and RA. UD, Hp 80, nr. 80, 30 Jan. 1947.
120. Memo by Grafström, RA UD, P 2 EuI, 30 Nov. 1946.
121. RA. UD. P 2 EuI, 'P.M.', 30 Nov. 1946.
122. RA. UD. P 2 EuI, 'P.M.' 14 Jan. 1947 and 'P.M. angående efterforskningarna efter Raoul Wallenberg', Ra. UD. P 2 EuI, 30 April 1951, 5–7.
123. RA. UD. P 2 EuI, nr. 789, 3 June 1947.
124. RA. UD. P 2 EuI, nr. 806, 5 June 1947.
125. Sohlman replaced Hägglöf as Envoy in April and he made no approaches regarding the matter before 12 June.
126. RA. UD. P 2 EuI, nr. 695, 14 March 1947. Thompson's article 'The Wallenberg Affair May Seem Small. But You Should Not Call It Insignificant', *The Boston Globe*, 18 April 1947. He had also met and talked with State Department Advisor on Refugees and Displaced, George L. Warren. Wallace's request to Novikov was commented in a letter from Vyshinskii to Abakumov of 7 July 1947. See Pis'mo zam.ministra inostrannykh del SSSR A. Ia. Vyshinskogo ministru gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR V. S. Abakumovu. Photocopy in RA. UD. P 2 EuI, 21 Nov. 1991.
127. *Novoie vremia*, 23–5.
128. RA. UD. P 2 EuI, nr 31, 11 June 1947. The mission was also instructed to approach Jankovich. P 2 Eu1, nr. 48, 19 Aug. 1947.
129. See also RA. UD. P 2 EuI, 31 March 1951, P 2 EuI, nr. 153, 6 April 1951 and P 2 EuI, 9 May 1951.
130. RA. UD. P 2 EuI, 9 May 1951.
131. 'Bericht von Otto Prade', Köln 15 Aug. 1950 in RA UD, P 2 EuI.
132. On the exchange hypothesis see *Working Group's Report*, 68, 90–3 and *A Failure of Diplomacy*, 455–85.
133. On the Eliasson's Commission's views on the Russian report, see *A Failure of Diplomacy*, 87–9.
134. The Russian report is titled *Rapport om verksamheten i den rysk-svenska arbetsgruppen för fastställande av Raoul Wallenbergs öde (1991–2000)*, photocopy in RA. UD. P 2 EuI, 20 Jan. 2001.

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